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The Death Penalty Cases:
Shaping Substantive Criminal Law
The United States Supreme Court has slowly, almost painfully, come
to grips with the implications of its 1972 plurality opinion that the death
penalty does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment per se.1 Subse-
quent decisions by the Court, however, while defining the due process
parameters of a constitutional capital punishment scheme, have not been
entirely free of internal inconsistency.2 Recent cases have illustrated the
struggle with this need to ensure scrupulous adherence to the highest
standards of procedural due process.'
States which have chosen to retain a capital punishment scheme have
not enacted identical statutes, but the various death penalty laws generally
provide for similar sentencing procedures. The typical capital murder trial
is separated into two distinct stages: one in which the defendant's guilt
or innocence is determined (the "guilt stage") and, should the defendant
be found guilty, one in which the appropriate punishment is assessed (the
"sentencing stage").4 In this bifurcated system, the court is reconvened
I Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). In Fur-man, it seemed clear that a majority
of the Court would hold that the death penalty need not invariably violate the Constitu-
tion although that ruling was not specifically reached. See id. at 307-08 (Stewart, J.,
concurring); id. at 310-11 (White, J., concurring); id. at 396-97 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), the Court explicitly stated that the death penalty
is not per se cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 169 (Stewart, J., plurality opinion).
2 Compare Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (requiring highly particularized
individual sentencing) with Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (requiring consistency
in sentencing and prohibiting disproportionate sentences). See generally Note, Capital
Punishment and the Burden of Proof: The Sentencing Decision, 17 CAL. W.L. REv. 316, 321
(1981).
3 "Because imposition of the death penalty is irrevocable in its finality, it is imperative
that the standards by which that sentence is fixed be constitutionally beyond reproach."
Commonwealth v. McKenna, 476 Pa. 428, 440, 383 A.2d 174, 181 (1978). See also, Sher v.
Stoughton, 516 F. Supp. 534, 547 (N.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 666 F.2d 791 (2d Cir.
1981); Note, The Impact of a Sliding-Scale Approach to Due Process On Capital Punishment
Litigation, 30 SYRACUSE L. REv. 675 (1979).
' The Indiana death penalty law, set out below is, except for the two sections in italics,
representative of the procedure and substantive content of most states' capital punish-
ment laws. The statute provides:
(a) The state may seek a death sentence for murder by alleging, on a page
separate from the rest of the charging instrument, the existence of at least
one [1] of the aggravating circumstances listed in subsection (b) of this section.
In the sentencing hearing after a person is convicted of murder, the state
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of at least one [1] of the
aggravating circumstances alleged.
(b) The aggravating circumstances are as follows:
(1) The defendant committed the murder by intentionally killing the victim
while committing or attempting to commit arson, burglary, child molesting,
criminal deviate conduct, kidnapping, rape, or robbery.
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for a sentencing hearing if a guilty verdict is returned in the initial stage
of the trial. If the state is seeking the death penalty, it must prove, usually
(2) The defendant committed the murder by the unlawful detonation of an
explosive with intent to injure person or damage property.
(3) The defendant committed the murder by lying in wait.
(4) The defendant who committed the murder was hired to kill.
(5) The defendant committed the murder by hiring another person to kill.
(6) The victim of the murder was a correction employee, fireman, judge, or
law-enforcement officer, and either (i) the victim was acting in the course of
duty or (ii) the murder was motivated by an act the victim performed while
acting in the course of duty.
(7) The defendant has been convicted of another murder.
(8) The defendant has committed another murder, at any time, regardless of
whether he has been convicted of that other murder.
(9) The defendant was under a sentence of life imprisonment at the time of
the murder.
(c) The mitigating circumstances that may be considered under this section
are as follows:
(1) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal conduct.
(2) The defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance when he committed the murder.
(3) The victim was a participant in, or consented to, the defendant's conduct.
(4) The defendant was an accomplice in a murder committed by another person,
and the defendant's participation was relatively minor.
(5) The defendant acted under the substantial domination of another person.
(6) The defendant's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or
to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired
as a result of mental disease or defect or of intoxication.
(7) Any other circumstances appropriate for consideration.
(d) If the defendant was convicted of murder in a jury trial, the jury shall
reconvene for the sentencing hearing; if the trial was to the court, or the
judgment was entered on a guilty plea, the court alone shall conduct the
sentencing hearing. The jury, or the court, may consider all the evidence in-
troduced at the trial stage of the proceedings, together with new evidence
presented at the sentencing hearing. The defendant may present any additional
evidence relevant to:
(1) the aggravating circumstances alleged; or
(2) any of the mitigating circumstances listed in subsection (c) of this section.
(e) If the hearing is by jury, the jury shall recommend to the court whether
the death penalty should be imposed. The jury may recommend the death
penalty only if it finds:
(1) that the state has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one [1]
of the aggravating circumstances exists; and
(2) that any mitigating circumstances that exist are outweighed by the ag-
gravating circumstance or circumstances.
The court shall make the final determination of the sentence, after considering
the jury's recommendation, and the sentence shall be based on the same standards
that the jury was required to consider. The court is not bound by the jury's
recommendation.
() If a jury is unable to agree on a sentence recommendation after reasonable
deliberation, the court shall discharge the jury and proceed as if the hearing
had been to the court alone.
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beyond a reasonable doubt,' that certain aggravating circumstances exist
and that these aggravating circumstances, which are made explicit in the
statute, outweigh any mitigating circumstances.
The sentencing stage of the bifurcated capital murder trial is the
legislative response to the constitutional mandates of Furman v. Georgia,'
which held, inter alia, that the death penalty could not be imposed
(g) If the hearing is to the court alone, the court shall sentence the defendant
to death only if it finds:
(1) that the state has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one [1]
of the aggravating circumstances exists; and
(2) that any mitigating circumstances that exist are outweighed by the
aggravating circumstance or circumstances.
(h) A death sentence is subject to automatic review by the Supreme Court.
The review, which shall be heard under rules adopted by the Supreme Court,
shall be given priority over all other cases. The death sentence may not be
executed until the Supreme Court has completed its review.
IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9 (1982).
This statute is typical with its provisions for weighing specific aggravating and mitigating
circumstances in a proceeding separate from the guilt stage of the trial. See, e.g., ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 41-1302 (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3-4 (West Supp. 1982); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 16-11-103 (Supp. 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a (West Supp. 1982); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11, § 4209 (Supp. 1982); GA. CODE ANN. S 26-3102 (1978); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1 (Smith-
Hurd 1979); Ky. REV. STAT. § 532.025 (Supp. 1982); LA. CODE CR. PROC. ANN. art. 905.3 (West
Supp. 1982); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413 (1982); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101 (Supp. 1982);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.006 (Vernon 1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 175.554 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 630.5 (Supp. 1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-1 (1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 (Supp.
1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03 (Page 1982); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, 5 701.11 (Supp. 1982-83);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (Law. Co-op. 1982); S. D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. S 23A-27A-4 (1979);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-203 (1982); TEX. CRBT. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071 (Vernon 1981); UTAH
CODE ANN . § 76-3-207 (1978); VA. CODE § 19.2-264A (Supp. 1981), Wyo. STAT. § 6-4-102 (1977).
Cf. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03 (Vernon 1974).
The Texas death penalty is markedly different as it incorporates many of the aggravating
circumstances into the statutory definition of captial murder. The statute retains the separate
sentencing proceeding but instead of weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances,
it requires the jury to answer in the affirmative three questions as a prerequisite to
imposition of the death penalty. Those three questions are:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased
was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death
of the deceased or another would result; (2) whether there is a probability
that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would con-
stitute a continuing threat to society; and (3) if raised by the evidence, whether
the conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased was unreasonable in
response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased.
TEX. CRA. PR0C. CODE ANN. § 37.071 (Vernon 1973).
Finally, note that under the Indiana death penalty law, the jury only recommends what
it considers to be the proper punishment. IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(e) (1982). If the jury cannot
agree upon a sentence recommendation, it is discharged by the court which then proceeds
as if, the hearing had been to it alone. IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(f) (1982).
1 The standard of proof under the Indiana death penalty law, as well as most other
states' laws, is the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. See, e.g., IND. CODE 5 35-50-2-9(e)(1)
(1982). The use of a standard less strict than the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard,
even where the fact finder is the jury, raises further constitutional questions which are
beyond the scope of this note but are addressed elsewhere in the literature. See, e.g., Note,
supra note 2.
' 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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arbitrarily,' and Woodson v. North Carolina,' which required that the
sentencing process consider the individual defendant's character and
actions.' These sentencing procedures require certain factual findings to
be made, in addition to those necessary to support a guilty verdict on
the murder charge, and an evaluation of the defendant's culpability for
his acts as a prerequisite to the imposition of the death penalty.
The subject of this note arises because the role of fact finder in the
sentencing stage has not uniformly been given to the jury-the party
traditionally and constitutionally charged with finding facts and deter-
mining culpability in a criminal trial. ' ° Briefly, this note argues that the
interaction between Supreme Court precedents 1 and the states' bifurcated
capital punishment schemes has wrought a substantive change in the
elements of the various degrees of homicide. The sentencing stage of a
capital murder trial has become, in substance, a trial to determine if the
defendant, already found guilty of "mere murder," is also guilty of the
greater crime of "capital murder."'2 Under this view, mere murder is a
lesser included offense of capital murder, and the aggravating
circumstances are actually factual elements of a crime distinct from the
mere murder for which the defendant has already been found guilty.
Because the state is now charging the defendant with a distinct crime,
the Constitution and its procedural due process guarantees require that
these additional fact findings be made by the jury; those states which
relegate the jury to an advisory role or dismiss the jury altogether follow-
ing the guilt stage have enacted unconstitutional death penalty laws.'"
' This characterization of Furman was adopted by the Court in Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189
(plurality opinion).
428 U.S. 280 (1976).
Id. at 304. "[I]n capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the
Eighth Amendment ... requires consideration of the character and record of the individual
offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensible
part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death." Id. (citations omitted).
0 As noted above, Indiana and certain other states relegate the jury to a purely advisory
role in the sentencing proceeding. See IND. CODE S 35-50-2-9 (1982); ALA. CODE S 13A-5-46
(1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. S 921.141 (West Supp. 1982). A number of states dismiss the jury
altogether and require the trial judge or a panel of judges to determine the sentence. See,
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (Supp. 1982-1983); IDAHO CODE S 19-2515 (1979); MONT. CODE
ANN. S 46-18-301 (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. S 29-2520 (1979); OR. REV. STAT. S 163.116 (Supp. 1979)
(repealed 1981). The majority of states, however, provide that the death penalty can be
imposed only after a jury has returned the appropriate findings of fact. See statutes cited
supra note 4.
"i The latest of which is Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981). See infra text accom-
panying notes 17-45.
" The terms "mere murder" and "capital murder" are not statutory terms. This note
will use the term "mere murder" to refer to those murders that meet the statutory definition
of a state's highest degree of homicide but for which the death penalty cannot be imposed,
either because of the nonexistence of a statutory aggravating factor or because of a counter-
balancing mitigating factor. A "capital murder," as the term is used herein, refers only
to those murders for which the death penalty can be imposed.
'" Alabama and Indiana courts have not yet articulated the standards a judge must follow
[Vol. 58:187
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The first part of this note analyzes the Supreme Court decisions which
have shaped the substantive criminal law in capital murder cases. This
section discusses Bullington v. Missouri,4 which demonstrates how the
substantive and procedural aspects of the bifurcated capital murder trial
have obscured the traditionally sharp distinction between the determina-
tion of guilt and the assessment of punishment- a distinction which carries
with it important procedural due process ramifications. This section also
contains a criticism of other possible resolutions to this problem. The sec-
ond part of this note focuses upon the procedural due process requirements
imposed by the Supreme Court, discussing these in the context of the
bifurcated capital murder trial, and concludes that a viable death penalty
statute must allow the jury to make a binding decision regarding the im-
position of capital punishment.
THE DEATH PENALTY CASES:
SHAPING SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW
Prior to the Supreme Court's death penalty decisions in the 1970's, few
courts accepted the argument that there existed any significant distinc-
tion between murders punishable by death and those which were not. 5
Sentencing in a capital trial was largely a matter of unfettered discretion
in setting aside a jury's recommendation in the sentencing proceeding. The Florida Supreme
Court, however, has ruled that "[i]n order to sustain a sentence of death following a jury
recommendation of life, the facts suggesting a death sentence should be so clear and
convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ." Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d.
908, 910 (Fla. 1975). It should be clear, however, that if the right to a jury trial of the
aggravating facts is a constitutional requirement, no self-imposed standard of review, no
matter how strict, can be used to excuse denial of that right.
Under the view taken in this note, the statutory grant of power to a judge to overrule
the jury's findings is, in effect, the grant of power to the judge to give the state a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict in a criminal trial, a constitutionally impermissible result. See
Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1973). "[W]e necessarily accord absolute finality to a
jury's verdict of acquittal-no matter how erroneous its decision." Id. at 15-16 (emphasis
omitted).
Since the thesis of this note is that the defendant has a right to a jury determination
of sentencing facts, this note does not affect statutory provisions which allow the judge
to impose a sentence based on the jury's findings of fact or which allow a judge to impose
a life sentence despite findings sufficient to support the death penalty. It should also be
noted that a defendant can always make an informed waiver of his right to a jury trial.
' 451 U.S. 430 (1981).
15 But see, Commonwealth v. Littlejohn, 433 Pa. 336, 250 A.2d 811 (1969); People v.
Henderson, 60 Cal. 2d 482, 386 P.2d 677, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1963). These are two of the few
cases in which courts, for the purposes of double jeopardy analysis, recognized this difference
by using an "implied aquittaF' rationale even though specific fact-finding was not then
required for sentencing. In the Henderson case, Justice Traynor wrote for the California
Supreme Court, en banc, that "[i]t is immaterial to the basic purpose of the constitutional
provision against double jeopardy whether the Legislature divides a crime into different
degrees carrying different punishments or allows the court or jury to fix different
punishments for the same crime." Id. at 497, 386 P.2d at 686, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 86.
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with a wide range of possible punishments."6 In 1972, however, the Court
issued a fragmented decision in Furman v. Georgia" which struck down
two state death penalty statutes and sent shock waves of change
throughout state legislatures. The exact parameters of the Court's holding
were vague, 8 but it was clear that the majority of the states' death penalty
laws, which allowed juries complete discretion in the imposition of the
death penalty, could not withstand the eighth amendment scrutiny of at
least five of the Justices. 9
The predominant theme of Furman was that state death penalty laws
were capable of being applied in an arbitrary and capricious manner-
that "under these laws no standards govern the selection of the [death]
penalty [and] [p]eople live or die, dependent on the whim of one man or
of 12."" For a majority of the Court, the problem with the death penalties
imposed in Furman was arbitrary application-that "there [was] no
meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed
from the many cases in which it is not.""1
If the exact scope of Furman was not clear, its message to legislators
was. By the time the Supreme Court again addressed a death penalty
issue, thirty-five states and the United States Congress had responded
to Furman with new death penalty legislation." The statutory responses
typically took one of two approaches: the statutes either specified certain
factors to be weighed and the procedures to be followed for the imposi-
tion of the death penalty, or made the imposition of a death sentence
mandatory for specific crimes.'
In a group of five companion cases, 4 the Court examined these
legislative answers to Furman, and upheld those statutes which sought
to limit the jury's sentencing discretion by specifying particular ag-
gravating and mitigating circumstances and by providing for a propor-
tionality review by an appellate court. 5 In Woodson v. North Carolina6
" See Bullington, 451 U.S. at 439-40 & n.13.
" 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
18 The per curiam opinion was but one paragraph holding that "the imposition and carrying
out of the death penalty in these cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment in viola-
tion of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." Id. at 239-40. Five Justices then filed
individual concurring opinions expressing widely divergent views.
" Justices Marshall and Brennan were prepared to declare that the death penalty was
unconstitutional per se. See Gregg, 428 U.S. 153, 226-31 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 231
(Marshall, J., dissenting). The other concurring opinions generally intimated that a sentencing
procedure which set standards to guide a jury's discretion would be constitutional. See,
e.g., Furman, 408 U.S. at 400 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Furman, 408 U.S. at 253 (Douglas, J., concurring).
z' Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179-80 & n.23 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 179-80 & nn.23-24.
Gregg, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas,
428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
' See Gregg, 428 U.S. 153 (1976 Proffit, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) Jurek, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
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and Roberts v. Louisiana,' however, the Court declared that mandatory
death penalties violated the eighth amendment's requirement of "con-
sideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the
circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable
part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death."28 Mandatory death
penalties suffered from the same problem the Court had articulated in
Furman. Without concrete, reviewable findings there was simply no in-
dication that the decision to impose the death penalty was a rational and
informed one. As Justice Stewart's plurality opinion explained it:
This conclusion rests squarely on the predicate that the penalty of
death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however
long. Death in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than
a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or two. Because
of that qualitative difference, there is a corresponding difference in
the need for reliability in the determination that death is the
appropriate punishment in a specific case.'
The Furman line of cases shows that the existence of aggravating
circumstances and their relationship to any mitigating circumstances are
not only statutorily necessary elements of a viable capital punishment
scheme but are "constitutionally indispensable" elements for the imposi-
tion of the death penalty. If the crime of murder requires proof of
additional factual circumstances in order to be punishable by death, it
is not unreasonable to argue that the Court has created two distinct crimes
of murder; owing to the qualitative difference of the death sentence,'
murder punishable by only life imprisonment (mere murder) becomes a
lesser included offense of murder punishable by death (capital murder)."
2 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304.
Id. at 305 (emphasis added).
The qualitative difference between the death sentence and any other sentence which
would be imposed in this country has been expressly recognized by a majority of the Court.
See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 (1976) (opinion of Stevens, Stewart & Powell,
JJ.); Gregg, 428 U.S. 153, 181-88 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.); id. at
231-41 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Furman, 408 U.S. 238, 286-91 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring);
id. at 306-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 314-71 (Marshall, J., concurring).
I In practical effect there is no substantive difference between the gradational differences
that exist between manslaughter and murder and the gradational differences between mere
murder and capital murder. In both cases proof of the existence of additional elements
supports a more severe sentence for the act and represents a legislative determination
that the actor is sufficiently more culpable so as to justify that sentence.
Other courts have suggested the view that mere murder is a lesser included crime of
captial murder. See, e.g., Gully v. Kunzman, 592 F.2d 283, 289 (6th Cir. 1979) wherein the
court considered the problem:
We have also considered the possibility that, by virtue of their exposure
to the new death statute, petitioners are not simply being retried for the same
'offenses' but are, in effect, being tried for greater inclusive 'capital offenses'
of the crimes of willful murder and armed robbery with which they were
charged at the first trial. We do not think this analysis far-fetched, since, under
the new scheme, a defendant convicted of a capital offense may not be sentenced
1982]
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While the traditional scope of the sixth amendment right to a jury trial
has not been extended to sentencing determinations,32 the Supreme Court
has long adhered to the view that "no man should be deprived of his life
under the forms of law unless the jurors who try him are able, upon their
consciences, to say that the evidence before them ... is sufficient to show
beyond a reaonable doubt the existence of every fact necessary to constitute
the crime charged." Combining this with the implication of Furman and
its progeny, that there are two distinct crimes of murder, it is reasonable
to conclude that a jury trial at the sentencing stage is required. Bullington
compels this conclusion, as it firmly conceptualizes the notion that there
now are two distinct crimes of murder.
Bullington v. Missouri: A Substantive Perspective on
Procedural Forms
As noted above, Furman and its progeny have brought about a
substantive change in the law which affects the way in which procedural
due process requirements, developed for the criminal trial, are applied
to the capital sentencing hearing. Bullington v. Missouri' illustrates how
this interaction can alter apparently long-settled constitutional doctrines.
In Bullington the Court considered the double jeopardy claim of a
convicted murderer who on appeal had secured a retrial due to constitu-
tional errors at trial.' The state had sought the death penalty in the initial
bifurcated proceeding, but the jury, after receiving evidence, at the
sentencing hearing, declined to impose the death penalty and instead
sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment.' At retrial, the state again
sought the death penalty and revealed that it would introduce the same
evidence concerning the aggravating circumstances that it had in the first
to death except upon a finding, 'beyond a reasonable doubt,' of certain
statutorily-prescribed 'aggravating factors.' These 'factors' might be conceived
of as elements of the 'greater' crimes of 'capital murder/armed robbery' rather
than simply as guides for the exercise of the sentencing authority's discretion
to fix an appropriate punishment for one convicted of 'simple' willful murder
and armed robbery.
See Collins v. State, 415 N.E.2d 46, 50-51 (1981).
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970) (quoting Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469,
493 (1895)) (emphasis added). Winship does not expressly hold that the right to a trial by
jury extends to every essential factual element of the crime charged. But see, State v.
Quinn, - Or - , - & n.1, 623 P.2d 630, 644 & n.1 (1981) (Tongue, J., concurring).
The exact holding of Winship is that, no matter who the fact finder may be, the state
must prove the existence of every essential element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable
doubt. However, joining that premise together with the constitutional right to a jury trial
in all but petty criminal prosecutions results in the obvious conclusion that a defendant
in a serious criminal prosecution has a right to a jury trial of every essential element
of the crime charged.
451 U.S. 430 (1981).
Id. at 435-37.
Id. at 435-36.
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trial." The defendant challenged the state's attempt to seek the death
penalty at his retrial, arguing that the double jeopardy clause barred the
imposition of the death sentence after the first jury had declined to impose
it. 8 The Court held that the double jeopardy clause prohibited the state
from obtaining a second chance to prove that this defendant's crime
warranted the death penalty. 9
The dissent was upset by what it considered to be the majority's
departure from a long line of precedents which held that the double
jeopardy clause did not apply to sentencing decisions after retrial "with
the same force that it applie[d] to redetermination of guilt or innocence."4
The linchpin for the majority, however, was the additional factual adjudica-
tion which was required before a murder could be considered a capital
murder and punished by death.4 The majority recognized that the
sentencing stage of the capital murder trial had "the hallmarks of the
trial on guilt or innocence,"42 and "was itself a trial on the issue of
punishment."'3 The state had undertaken "the burden of establishing cer-
tain facts beyond a reasonable doubt in its quest to obtain the harsher
of the two alternative verdicts," and the Court went on to note that "by
enacting a capital sentencing procedure that resembles a trial on the issue
of guilt or innocence ... Missouri explicitly requires the jury to deter-
mine whether the prosecution has proved its case. 45 The Court concluded
that "[a] verdict of acquittal on the issue of guilt or innocence is, of course
absolutely final. The values that underlie this principle ... are equally
applicable when a jury has rejected the State's claim that the defendant
deserves to die .... 4
The Bullington Court relied heavily upon Green v. United States47 which
held that a jury conviction for the lesser included offense of second-degree
murder operated as an "implied acquittal" of the greater charge of first-
degree murder and barred subsequent retrial for that first-degree murder
charge." Green thus puts in context the Bullington Court's statement that
"the sentence of life imprisonment which petitioner received at his first
I, Id. at 436.
33 Id.
I Id. at 446. The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment is, of course, made
applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S.
784, 794 (1969).
Bullington, 451 U.S. at 447 (Powell, J., dissenting).
' Id. at 444. The majority distinguished the earlier cases dealing with double jeopardy
challenges to sentencing decisions by pointing out that those earlier decisions were not
made in an adversary context under statutory standards and guidelines. Id. at 443-45.
42 Id. at 439.
Id. at 438 (emphasis added).
Id- at 438.
Id. at 444.
Id- at 445 (emphasis added).
355 U.S. 184 (1957).
48 Bullington, 451 U.S. at 443-45.
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trial meant that 'the jury has already acquitted the defendant of whatever
was necessary to impose the death sentence.' "I'
Although the Court used the word "acquittal" without articulating the
obvious underlying premise that, conceptually, a defendant can only be
acquitted of a crime and not a sentence, the Bullington Court's reliance
upon Green must indicate that they recognized the existence of the greater
crime of capital murder and the lesser included offense of mere murder.
Indeed, recognition of this concept was the only possible basis for
harmonizing Bullington with longstanding tenets of double jeopardy
doctrine which allow a harsher sentence on retrial, even in the pre-Furman
death penalty cases, yet forbid retrial for a greater offense following a
conviction for a lesser included offense.50
Distinctions Without a Difference
Bullington adds further support to the concept of two distinct crimes
of murder as articulated above and demonstrates how the substantive
and procedural aspects of bifurcated capital murder trials have obscured
the traditionally sharp distinction between determinations of guilt and
assessments of punishment, a distinction with important procedural due
process ramifications. Despite the blurring of this traditional distinction,
some scholars have attempted to articulate a constitutional difference
between the determination of facts necessary to establish guilt and those
necessary to impose a particular sentence. These distinctions would
prevent the full extension of procedural due process protections to the
capital sentencing decision.
These suggested distinctions are, however, not dispositive of the due
process question, and tend to be, at best, unhelpful, and in some cases,
patently wrong. On the other hand, a pair of Supreme Court cases suggest
that the proposed distinctions between the factual determination of guilt
and the factual imposition of a capital sentence is a distinction without
a difference, and that for purposes of due process analysis, the similarities
are substantially more significant.
In State v. Quinn,5 the Oregon Supreme Court declared that state's
"' Id. at 445. On this point, the majority incorporated the sound dissent of Chief Justice
Bardgett in the lower court's ruling. See State ex rel. Westfall v. Mason, 594 S.W.2d 908,
922 (Mo. 1980) (Bardgett, C.J., dissenting).
o Compare North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969) and Stroud v. United States,
251 U.S. 15 (1919) (a defendant whose conviction is reversed may receive a more severe
sentence upon retrial) with Green, 355 U.S. 184 (1957) (a defendant could not be retried
for first-degree murder after a jury at his first trial had convicted him of only second-
degree murder). See also United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980). "[T]he difference
in result reached in Green and Pearce can be explained only on the grounds that the
imposition of sentence does not operate as an implied acquittal of any greater sentence."
Id. at 136, n.14.
" __ Or. -, 623 P.2d 630 (1981).
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death penalty to be an unconstitutional denial of a defendant's right to
a trial by jury because the statute allowed the judge to impose the death
penalty upon a finding of premeditation made by the court once the jury
had found an intentional killing.2 The court acknowledged that it had,
in the past, upheld other enhanced penalty statutes even though they
too required additional post trial fact findings as the basis for a more
severe sentence.' The difference, however, between those statutes and
the death penalty law at issue was, according to the court, "found in the
simple principle that the facts which constitute the crime are for the jury
and those which characterize the defendant are for the sentencing court."'
The court then applied this distinction to the terms of the death penalty
statute:
[D]eliberation in the act of homicide is part of an act declared by the
legislature to be criminal. Because the extent of punishment is to be
determined according to the existence of that proscribed fact, it must
be proved at trial. The contrast is clear: Deliberate homicide is not
a status; it is an offense. If a defendant is to be punished for it, he
is entitled to require the state to prove it to a jury.'
Although the court did ultimately conclude that the defendant was entitled
to a jury determination on the question of sentencing, it is its distinction
between acts and status, which could produce the opposite result under
a differently constructed statute, that is troublesome. Its foremost problem
is that it does not readily lend itself to any sort of reasonable "bright
line" test when the precise death penalty statutory language is analyzed.-
This is apparent when one considers that an aggravating circumstance
common to many death penalty statutes is that the murder was especially
heinous or cruel."7 It is very difficult to tell whether this aggravating
circumstance is meant to describe the types of criminal acts for which
the death penalty is being sought or whether it merely characterizes the
Id at -' 623 P.2d at 644.
Id- at -' 623 P.2d at 643. The court noted that it had upheld the state's habitual
offender and sexually dangerous offender laws over challenges similar to that on which
the state's death penalty law was now being struck down. Id.
U I&.
£3Id,
" This particular problem was singled out by Justice Peterson in his concurrence:
I am convinced that [in this case] the ... element of deliberateness is one
of the facts which constitute the crime, and therefore the defendant is entitled
to a jury. But while it is easy to state the simple principle, I fear future cases
will arise which make the application of the simple principle difficult.
Quinn, - Or. at - 623 P.2d at 655-56 (Peterson, J., concurring) (quotations omitted).
The majority opinion itself noted that under its distinction there were aggravating
circumstances other than the requisite mens rea of the crime that would appear to con-
stitute the criminal act. Id. at 644.
-, See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 5 53a-46a(S)(4) (Supp. 1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§4209(e)(n) (Supp. 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)(h) (West Supp. 1982); IDAHO CODE
519-2515(f)(5) (1979); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523(lXd) (1979).
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defendant as the type of sadistic murderer who justly deserves the death
penalty. It is a distinction which is basically useless since most statutory
aggravating and mitigating circumstances arguably involve questions of
fact about the defendant's acts.58
Justice Powell, dissenting in Bullington v. Missouri, proposes a different
distinction between determinations of guilt or innocence and sentencing."
According to Justice Powell, an objective truth underlies the question
of guilt or innocence; the defendant in fact did or did not do the criminal
acts charged."
From the time an accused is first suspected to the time the decision
on guilt or innocence is made, our criminal-justice system is designed
to enable the trier of fact to discover that truth according to law.
But triers of fact can err, and an innocent person can be pronounced
guilty. In contrast, the law provides only limited standards for
assessing the validity of a sentencing decision. The sentener'sfnction
is not to discover a fact but to mete out just deserts as he sees them.
Absent a mandatory sentence, there is no objective measure by which
Consider Justice Peterson's query. After expressing his concern with the majority's
"simple principle" he asked: "[flor example, if our death penalty law were identical to Florida's
.... could aggravating factors (c) through (h) properly be considered by the court rather
than a jury? Would those factors be 'the facts which constitute the crime'?" Quinn,
. Or. at - n.7, 623 P.2d at 656 n.7.
The Florida statutory aggravating circumstances to which Justice Peterson referred are:
(a) The capital felony was committed by a person under sentence of
imprisonment.
(b) The defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a
felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person.
(c) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons.
(d) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged, or
was an accomplice, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight
after committing or attempting to commit, any robbery, rape, arson, burglary,
kidnapping, or aircraft piracy or the unlawful throwing, placing, or discharg-
ing of a destructive device or bomb.
(e) The capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing
a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody.
(f) The capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain.
(g) The capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise
of any governmental function or the enforcement of laws.
(h) The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)(a)-(h) (West Supp. 1982).
Indiana's aggravating and mitigating circumstances pose similar difficulties if analyzed
using the Quinn status/act test. See IND. CODE material cited supra note 4. Keeping in mind
that mental states as well as physical acts constitute elements of the crime, aggravating
factors (b)(1)-(6) all involve questions of fact about the defendant's acts or motives.
Aggravating factor (b)(1), in fact, produces the very result prohibited by the Quinn court:
the defendant may be sentenced to death by a judicial determination of the requisite mens
rea of intent. Assuming that mitigating factor (c)(1) is meant to be limited to the defen-
dant's official police record, the other five mitigating circumstances, enumerated (c)(2)46),
all require factual determinations about the defendant's acts or mental state in regard
to the murder charged.
" 451 U.S. at 447-53.
' Id. at 450.
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the sentencer's decision can be deemed correct or erroneous if it is duly
made within the authority conferred by the legislature."
While the Oregon Supreme Court's distinction between status and acts
has utility within a limited range, Justice Powell's distinction between
objective and subjective is clearly incorrect, ignoring more than a decade
of Supreme Court precedent. Subjective imposition of the death penalty
was forbidden by the Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia62 in 1972. In-
deed, the constitutional state death penalty statutes are all based on the
assumption that the sentencing procedure is a rational process, that the
sentencer's discretion can be directed and limited, and that a sentencing
decision can be rationally reviewed by the state's highest court by cer-
tain objective standards.3 A death sentence, like any guilty verdict, would
have to be overturned if the supporting factual determinations were shown
to be unsupported by objective and sufficient evidence. 4
In the end, the main criticism of both of these distinctions is that neither
seems to be constitutionally significant; neither distinction justifies draw-
ing a due process line between those elements to which constitutional
procedural protections would extend and those elements to which it would
not. The distinction between status and act would cut a vague and ragg-
ed line between the factors which most state death penalty statutes cur-
rently deem to be significant. Justice Powell's distinction between objec-
tive and subjective, is at once both over and under inclusive. Many sentenc-
ing factors are obviously "objective" factors while others are arguably
no more subjective than factors traditionally considered to be the proper
subject of a jury determination. 5
Balanced against these questionable distinctions is a pair of Supreme
Court cases, Mullaney v. Wilbur" and Patterson v. New York,6 7 which sug-
61 Id. (emphasis added).
'2 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Because of the uniqueness of the death penalty, Furman held
that it could not be imposed under sentencing procedures that created a substantial risk
that it would be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. Furman mandates that
where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination
of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed
and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action. Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188-89 (1975).
1 All of the state death penalty statutes require review by that state's highest court,
and most require that court to promulgate rules by which the sentencing proceeding will
be reviewed. See, e.g., IND. CODE S 35-50-2-9(h) (1977); see generally Note, ProportionalityReview
and the Indiana Death Sentence, 58 Ind. L.J. - (1983).
" State v. Jordan, 126 Ariz. 283, 286, 614 P.2d 825, 828 (1980); State v. Culberth, 390
So. 2d 847 (La. 1980). "In every case where the death sentence is recommended this court
must determine whether the aggravating circumstances cited by the jury are supported
by the evidence." Id. at 850.
" For example, juries have traditionally been given evaluative questions of fact concerning
the defendant's acts or mental state such as "reasonableness" "willful and wantonness,"
and, perhaps most subjective of all, "sanity:'
421 U.S. 684 (1975).
67 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
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gest a constitutionally significant similarity between the factual elements
of a crime and the factual determinations necessary to support the death
penalty. Mullaney and Patterson are relevant because they were the
Supreme Court's attempt to define which factual issues in a criminal trial
warrant procedural due process protections. In Mullaney and Patterson
the specific procedural protection was the requirement that the state
shoulder the burden of proving each element of the crime, while in the
present case the procedural protection implicated is the right to demand
a jury determination of each element of the crime. In both instances the
scope of the right is measured by a determination of which factual issues
constitute the elements of the crime charged.
In Mullaney the defendant attacked the constitutionality of Maine's
homicide law. Maine law recognized but one generic crime of felonious
homicide with two punishment categories: murder, punishable by a life
sentence, and manslaughter, punishable by a fine or imprisonment not
to exceed twenty years.68 The state assumed the burden of proving that
the defendant's actions were unlawful and intentional, which under the
statute established the felonious homicide, and then allowed the jury to
presume from those two elements that the homicide was "with malice
aforethought," thereby establishing murder. 9 A defendant, in order to
rebut that presumption and establish that his act merely constituted
manslaughter, had the burden of proving that his act was done not with
malice aforethought but "in the heat of passion, on sudden provocation."7
The defendant argued, on the basis of In re Winship,7' that requiring
a defendant to negate malice aforethought was a violation of the due
process requirement that the state prove each element of the crime.2
Maine, in response, pointed out that as a matter of form the issue of the
presence or absence of provocation was not a fact necessary to constitute
the crime of felonious murder but was merely a policy factor affecting
the extent of punishment.' The Court rejected Maine's contention stating
that:
The fact remains that the consequences resulting from a verdict of
murder, as compared with a verdict of manslaughter, differ
significantly. ...
Moreover, if Winship were limited to those facts that constitute
a crime as defined by state law, a State could undermine many of
the interests that decision sought to protect without effecting any
substantive change in its law. It would only be necessary to redefine
Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 688-89. See also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, SS 2551, 2651 (1964)
(repealed 1976).
11 Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 688, 691.
70 Id. at 688, 691-92.
7' 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
1 Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 684.
7' Id. at 696-97 & n.23.
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the elements that constitute different crimes, characterizing them as
factors that bear solely on the extent of punishment ...
Winship is concerned with substance rather than this kind of
formalism. The rationale of that case requires an analysis that looks
to the 'operation and effect of the law as applied and enforced by
the State,' ... and to the interests of both the State and the defendant
as affected by the allocation of the burden of proof. 4
Many commentators foresaw a sweeping substantive change in the penal
laws of the states because of Mullaney which would force the prosecution
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt any fact affecting the defendant's
criminal culpability, from affirmative defenses to sentencing reports.'5
Concerned that Mullaney would severely impede legislative reform of the
criminal justice system and possibly result in the repeal of modern penal
codes with many ameliorative affirmative defense provisions, the Court,
in Patterson v. New York"8 sharply curtailed Mullaney. Decided just two
years later and under remarkably similar facts, 8 Patterson stated that
although it was argued that Mullaney required that any "identified fact"
which affected the "blameworthiness of an act or the severity of the
punishment" be considered an element of the crime, the "Mullaney holding
should not be so broadly read."' Rather the Court held that due process
protection attaches to only those "fact[s] which the State deems so
important that [they] must be either proved or presumed ..... "Perhaps
aware that this delineation of which elements a state must prove was
somewhat tautological, the Court issued the warning that "there are ob-
viously constitutional limits beyond which the States may not go"81 in
deleting elements from the definition of a crime.
There are two important concerns behind the Patterson decision. First,
perhaps due to federalism concerns, the Court was extremely reluctant
to begin a wholesale substantive due process review of state penal laws. 2
7' Id. at 698-99 (citations omitted).
75 See, e.g., Note, Affirmative Defenses After Mullaney v. Wilbur: New York's Extreme
Emotional Disturbance, 43 BROOKLYN L. REv. 171 (1976); Note, Affirmative Defenses in Ohio
After Mullaney v. Wilbur, 36 OHIO ST. L.J. 828 (1975); Comment, Unburdening the Criminal
Defendant: Mullaney v. Wilbur and the Reasonable Doubt Standard, 11 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L.
Rev. 390 (1976).
71 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
Id. at 214-15 & n.15.
"' The New York law on second-degree murder had two elements: the intent to cause
the death and causation. The third factor, malice aforethought, which the Maine law had
allowed the jury to presume, was entirely deleted as an element. The mitigating factor
on which the defendant had the burden of proof was "extreme emotional disturbance" a
broader category than Maine's "heat of passion:' See id. at 216-21 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id. at 214-15 (opinion of the Court).
Id. at 215.
" Id. at 210.
See id. at 201-02. On this point, Justice Powell noted that "[t]he Court beats its retreat
from Winship apparently because of a concern that otherwise the federal judiciary will
intrude too far into substantive choices concerning the content of a State's criminal law."
Id. at 227-28 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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Second, the Court apparently thought that if a state had the power to
completely disregard a factor in setting standards of criminal culpability,
then it surely should be able to allow consideration of that factor but
require that the defendant assume the burden of proving that factor.3
Therefore, Patterson would seem to define the elements of a crime to
which procedual due process attaches as those factual ingredients that
the state, as a matter of substantive policy, deems crucial for the deter-
mination of culpability, but constrained by constitutional requirements
such as proving the existence of actus reus and scienter.Y
Under this interpretation of Patterson, procedural due process must
attach to both capital murder aggravating factors and their relationship
with any mitigating factors. The substantive content of these factors are
facts which the state has deemed to be so important in assessing the
culpability of a criminal defendant that it has undertaken the task of
proving their existence. Much more importantly, these factors, whatever
content the state may give them, are constitutionally essential to establish
the qualitatively greater crime of capital murder. 5
In another context, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that despite
formal structure there exists no significant difference between defining
capital murder so as to include aggravating factors and defining those
aggravating factors as sentencing standards for the crime of mere murder.
Chief Justice Burger, in his dissenting opinion to Furman, noted that:
[L]egislative bodies may seek to bring their laws into compliance with
the Court's ruling by providing standards for juries and judges to
follow in determining the sentence in capital cases or by more nar-
rowly defining the crimes for which the penalty is to be imposed.
[ T]hese two alternatives are substantially equivalent."
Likewise the plurality opinion of Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens
in Jurek v. Texas" concluded that:
While Texas has not adopted a list of statutory aggravating
circumstances the existence of which can justify the imposition of the
death penalty as have Georgia and Florida, its action in narrowing
the categories of murders for which the death sentence may ever be
See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 207-08. "The Due Process Clause . .. does not put New
York to the choice of abandoning those defenses or undertaking to disprove their existence
in order to convict of a crime which otherwise is within its constitutional powers to sanction
by substantial punishment:' Id
' See, e.g., Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 535 (1968); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.
660 (1962) (holding that criminal punishment for narcotics addiction constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment); see also Jeffries & Stephan, Defenses, Presumptions and Burden of
Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1325, 1365-78 (1979).
See supra text accompanying notes 30-39.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 400 & n.30 (1972).
428 U.S. 262 (1975).
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imposed serves much the same purpose. ... In fact, each of the five
classes of murders made capital by the Texas statute is encompassed
in Georgia and Florida by one or more of their statutory aggravating
circumstances.... Thus, in essence, the Texas statute requires that
the jury find the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance
before the death penalty may be imposed.'
It is, of course, obviously true that there is no functional difference
between these two methods of defining the crime of capital murder.
Nonetheless, there is one terribly unconscionable difference. Under the
Texas death penalty statute a defendant would have a constitutionally
protected right to a jury trial of the facts which constitute the crime of
capital murder; under the Georgia statute, the defendant has a gratitious
grant of a jury trial of those same factors; under Florida law the defendant
has no right to a jury trial. This "now-you-see-it-now-you-don't" approach,
caused by an admittedly insubstantial distinction, is totally inappropriate
for a right which the Constitution views as a "fundamental matter."89
No matter what distinction may be attempted, there is one similarity
between all of these questions of fact in the sentencing stage: they are
all factors which establish the defendant's greater criminal culpability and
justify the state's imposition of its harshest punishment. 0 Because the
determination of these factors is a statutory and constitutional prerequisite
to the imposition of the death penalty, any one of the underlying facts
must be considered a fact that is necessary to establish the crime charged
and therefore the proper subject of a due process analysis.
EVOLVING STANDARDS OF DuE PROCESS
AND THE PROFFITT DICTA
It is clear that some procedural due process guarantees attach to the
Id. at 270 (opinion by Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.) (citations omitted).
Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 208 (1967).
9 Missouri Supreme Court Justice Seiler, in his dissent to the lower court treatment
of Bullington, disputed the majority's assertion that the jury's sole function at the sentencing
proceeding was to assess the proper punishment.
[T]he principle opinion makes much of the fact that there is but one crime
of capital murder and refuses to acknowledge that the statutory framework
treats capital murder markedly different than any other crime ... and that
taken alone [the statutory definition of capital murder] is incomplete. Without
a penalty being prescribed, it is no more than an abstract declaration of law.
A killing may be unlawful, willful, knowing, deliberate, and premediated, yet
that is not all capital murder encompasses. In addition to guilt, there must
also be found by a jury, beyond a reasonable doubt, aggravating circumstances
which the jury must designate in writing in its verdict. Capital murder is
meaningless without the punishment. There is no such thing as a conviction
of capital murder per se without more. It has to be either capital murder with
death or capital murder with life imprisonment.... This does not "rend" the
crime of capital murder. Rather, it recognizes what we all know to be a fact.
State ex rel. Westfall v. Mason, 594 S.W.2d 908, 924 (Mo. 1980) (Seiler, J., dissenting).
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sentencing stage of a capital murder trial. The more difficult question
is whether the full panoply of due process guarantees apply. High courts
in several states have rejected the notion that a defendant is entitled
to a jury determination of all the factual elements necessary to support
the death penalty." These decisions have dismissed the argument
summarily with very little analysis other than citation to dicta92 in Prof-
fitt v. Florida,93 in which the Court, comparing two different state death
penalty statutes noted that:
[t]he basic difference between the Florida system and the Georgia
system is that in Florida the sentence is determined by the trial judge
rather than the jury. This Court has pointed out that jury sentencing
in a capital case can perform an important social function,
... but it has never suggested that jury sentencing is constitutional-
ly required. And it would appear that judicial sentencing, should lead,
if anything, to even greater consistency in the imposition at the trial
court level of capital punishment, since a trial court judge is more
experienced in sentencing than a jury, and therefore is better able
to impose sentences similar to those imposed in analogous cases.'
This passage, almost in the form of historical observation, that the
Supreme Court "has never suggested that jury sentencing is constitu-
tionally required," may or may not be viewed as a holding.9 5 It should
be pointed out that, as shown by the quotation itself, the Court's atten-
tion in Proffitt was focused primarily upon the need for consistency as
a means of avoiding the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment." If consistency were the only constitutional concern
involved, then it would be impossible to deny that a judicial determination
of the sentencing facts is as fair a determination as one made by a jury.
But since 1976 the Supreme Court has become increasingly concerned
with the procedural due process aspects of capital punishment.' Shortly
"' See, e.g., State v. Watson, 120 Ariz. 441, 586 P.2d 1253 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
924 (1979); State v. Simants, 197 Neb. 549, 250 N.W.2d 881 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
878 (1978); State v. Weind, 50 Ohio St. 2d 224, 364 N.E.2d 244 (1977), vacated on other grounds,
438 U.S. 911 (1978).
' See, e.g., Watson, 120 Ariz. at 447, 586 P.2d at 1259; Simants, 197 Neb. at 558-59, 250
N.W.2d at 887.
428 U.S. 242 (1975).
Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 252 (plurality opinion of Powell, Stevens & Stewart, JJ.).
9 Despite the several courts referred to in supra note 91 which clearly considered this
portion of the Proffitt plurality controlling, Justice Peterson in Quinn could concede only
that the Supreme Court had possibly rejected the argument that "the imposition of the
death penalty by the judge, in the bifurcated postverdict hearing violates the defendant's
right to a jury trial." - Or. at __, 623 P.2d at 653 (Peterson, J., dissenting). Neither
position seems accurate considering the lines on which the case was decided. See supra
note 94.
" See, e.g., Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 251-59 (plurality); Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 260-61 (concurrence).
" Sher v. Stoughton, 516 F. Supp. 534, 547 (N.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 666 F.2d
791 (2d Cir. 1981). See generally, Note, The Impact of a Sliding Scale Approach to Due Process
on Capital Punishment Litigation, 30 SYRACUSE L. REv. 675, 675-81 (1979).
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after Proffitt, three Justices acknowledged the "obligation to re-examine
capital-sentencing procedures against evolving standards of procedural
fairness in a civilized society."' The plurality declared that "it is now
clear that the sentencing process, as well as the trial itself, must satisfy
the requirement of the Due Process Clause."99 Two years later the
Supreme Court confirmed its shift in emphasis from an eighth amend-
ment analysis to a due process review,10 and held that "fundamental
principles of procedural fairness apply with no less force at the penalty
phase of a trial in a capital case than they do in the guilt-determination
phase of any criminal trial."''
The evolving concept of procedural due process in the capital sentencing
proceeding has transformed the constitutional landscape in this area in
the last decade. Sentencing, which was once considered a matter of
unfettered discretion in capital cases is now subject to a wide range of
constitutional procedural safeguards. In a capital murder sentencing
proceeding, the defendant has the right to counsel,'" the right to confront
witnesses,' 3 the right to notice of the state's evidence,' the right to in-
troduce all relevant mitigating evidence' 5 even if it might be excludable
under state rules of evidence,' and the right to double jeopardy protec-
tion on sentencing issues when granted a retrial."7
Due process, perhaps more than any other area of constitutional law,
is a reflection of society's ever changing values and interests.' It is not
static and, especially in the area of capital punishment, a holding that
11 Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 & n.7 (1977) (plurality opinion of Stevens, J.,
joined by Stewart & Powell, JJ.).
Id. at 358. The potential ramifications of the plurality's assertions are broad indeed
when one considers the separate opinions of Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall. Justice
Brennan commented, "I agree for the reasons stated in the plurality opinion that the Due
Process Clause ... is violated [by the sentencing procedure used by] the sentencing judge."
Id. at 364. Justice Marshall noted the sentencing procedures used by the trial judge are
"[o]bviously ... enough to deny due process." Id. at 365.
"' See Note, supra note 97, at 676 n.8. This is not meant to suggest that the Court has
discarded its eighth amendment analysis altogether or that in an appropriate case it will
not return to an eighth amendment analysis. In theory, however, most state death penalty
statutes now meet the demands of the eighth amendment through the use of various
safeguards designed to prevent arbitrary or capricious results on the whole. See supra
note 10. The current focus is on the individual and the trial rather than upon the statutes,
in an effort to refine the process through which the death penalty is imposed.
Presnell v. Georgia, 439 U.S. 14, 16 (1978) (per curiam).
Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 610 (1967).
103 Id.
"' Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 361 (1977).
"' Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978).
" Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979).
Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 446 (1981).
"' "It is the progression of history, and especially the deepening realization of the
substance and procedures that justice and the demands of human dignity require, which
has caused this Court to invest the command of 'due process of law' with increasingly
greater substance." Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 212 (1968) (Fortas, J., concurring).
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certain procedural protections are not constitutionally required cannot
be presumed to be written in stone."9 Developments in constitutional law
concerning the death penalty since Proffitt"' and the developing trend
of refining the procedure for imposing the death penalty now suggest
the need for a much more thorough treatment of this topic by the United
States Supreme Court. However, the shift to a due process analysis by
the Court and the trend to extend procedural rights to the sentencing
stage of the capital murder trial does not automatically guarantee a
defendant a right to a jury determination on sentencing issues. "The fact
that due process applies does not, of course, implicate the entire panoply
of criminal trial procedural rights. 'Once it is determined that due process
applies, the question remains what process is due.' " Determining how
much process is due can only be answered by balancing the rights and
interests of the individual against those of the state.' 2
The most apparent state concern is the constitutional requirement that
the death penalty not be imposed arbitrarily and the resultant notion,
expressed in Proffitt, that judges are better able to impose consistent
sentences because of their experience."3 But while the goal of consistency
is no doubt an essential state interest, the best means of achieving that
goal is open to dispute. In any criminal trial there are factual determina-
" In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), the Court noted that "[it] had never intimated
prior to Furman that discretion in sentencing offended the Constitution .... As recently
as McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), the Court had specifically rejected the con-
tention that discretion in imposing the death penalty violated the fundamental standards
of . . . due process . . . " Id. at 598 (citation omitted). Compare Bullington v. Missouri,
451 U.S. 430 (1981) (defendant in bifurcated capital sentencing proceeding is protected on
retrial against imposition of the harsher punishment by the double jeopardy clause) with
United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980) (defendant in bifurcated special dangerous
offender sentencing proceeding has no right to double jeopardy protection against imposi-
tion of a harsher punishment upon appellate review of sentence).
110 See supra notes 101, 104-07 and accompanying text which set out the case-by-case
treatment of procedural due process rights in the capital sentencing proceeding provided
by the Supreme Court.
... Gardner, 430 U.S. at 358 n.9 (quoting Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
'" Such a balancing test is the usual method, endorsed by the Supreme Court, for
determining what precise procedures are required by due process. See Gardner, 430 U.S.
at 358-59; Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 208 (1968).
"' Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 252. Contra Gillers, Deciding Vvh7o Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 58-59
(1980) (arguing that in actual practice few trial judges are exposed to a sufficient number
of capital murder trials to support Proffitt's consistency argument); Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145, 153-58 (1967):
[At] the heart of the dispute have been express or implicit assertions that
juries are incapable of adequately understanding evidence or determining issues
of fact, and that they are unpredictable, quixotic, and little better than a roll
of dice. Yet, the most recent and exhaustive study of the jury in criminal
cases concluded that juries do understand the evidence and come to sound
conclusions in most of the cases presented to them and that when juries dif-
fer with the result at which the judge would have arrived, it is usually because
they are serving some of the very purposes for which they were created and
for which they are now employed.
Id. at 157 (citing KALVEN & ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966)).
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tions which because of their complexity could be handled more consistently
by an experienced trial judge, yet the American criminal justice system
and our Constitution have made a conscious choice to retain the jury
system because it has been thought that the jury can be adequately guided
by instructions and statutes.' Under the procedures required by the
Constitution for death penalty statutes, the danger of an arbitrary
imposition of the death penalty by a jury is curbed. The jury decision
is restricted to consideration of specific aggravating circumstances. The
jury must usually find these circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.
Their findings must be in writing. The trial judge is often allowed to
reduce any jury-imposed death penalty to a life sentence. The state's
highest court is instructed to review the proceeding and compare it to
similar capital trials. The United States Supreme Court has held that
such safeguards are sufficient protection against arbitrary and capricous
imposition of the death penalty.1 5 These alternative safeguards and the
fact that the majority of the modern death penalty statutes do not allow
the judge to make the post-conviction factual fingings. 6 belie any argu-
ment that there exists a strong state interest in denying a defendant a
trial by jury in the sentencing proceeding.
The interest of a criminal defendant, on the other hand, in being able
to plead his entire case to a jury of his peers can be of ultimate
importance.117 As Justice Fortas has stated, "the right to jury trial in
major prosecutions, state as well as federal, is so fundamental to the
protection of justice and liberty that 'due process of law' cannot be
accorded without it."
1
"
8
In addition to the personal rights and interests of the capital murder
defendant, society also has an interest in allowing jury input into the
114 "[Important safeguards have been devised to minimize miscarriages of justice through
the malfunctioning of the jury system. Perhaps to some extent we sacrifice efficiency, ex-
pedition, and economy, but the choice in favor of jury trial has been made, and retained,
in the Constitution." Bloom, 391 U.S. at 209 (1967).
" Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 247-53.
"' See supra note 10.
Citing the comparable guarantee to a jury trial found in Oregon's Constitution, Justice
Peterson noted that:
This constitutional right exists for the protection of every person in Oregon,
and no statute which limits the right to a jury trial is enforceable. The right
to a jury trial as to every element of a criminal prosecution is an important
right-in some person's lives, it is their most important right.
State v. Quinn, - Or. - , -, 623 P.2d 630, 652 (1981) (Peterson, J., concurring).
Extending the right to a jury trial to the capital sentencing proceeding would also give
the defendant the traditional right to have the jury nullify the law in his case, see Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1967), and possibly result in more consistency in the guilt
determination stage of a capital murder trial. A jury which is denied the power to prohibit
the death penalty may register their disapproval of that punishment by either acquitting
the defendant or returning a verdict for a lesser offense when they would not have done
so otherwise.
I" Bloom, 391 U.S. at 212 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring).
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sentencing decision. Procedural safeguards have been developed to
prevent capricious results, but the sentencing decision is hardly a purely
mathematical calculation.1 '9 In addition to resolving questions of pure fact
the sentencer is also called upon to decide if the mitigating circumstances
outweigh the aggravating circumstances or whether it is probable that
the defendant will constitute a continuing threat to society. The answers
to these questions determine whether the defendant will live or die, yet
these are special kinds of questions of fact. These questions require the
sentencer to bring into the equation some notion of the values of the
community. In this process the jury, in its role as the representative of
the society, is much more qualified than a judge to identify which members
of society are so dangerous and which acts are so reprehensible that they
deserve society's most severe punishment. '
CONCLUSION
Because it is now constitutionally required that the death sentence be
imposed only upon proof of specified facts and circumstances, it is possible
to distinguish between the crimes of mere murder and captial murder.
In a capital murder trial a criminal defendant should have a constitutional
right to a jury trial of all the factual determinations essential to the
imposition of the death penalty. Although the Supreme Court has long
recognized a criminal defendant's right to a jury trial of all the factual
elements of the crime for which he is charged, it has not recognized a
right to a jury determination of sentencing facts. However, as Bullington
illustrates, former constitutional distinctions between determinations of
guilt and determinations of sentence are being re-examined in light of
the evolving concepts of procedural due process for imposing the death
penalty. The Bullington Court ignored the form of the sentencing
proceeding and viewed it in substance as an additional trial in which the
state had the burden of proving facts which would warrant the imposition
of a more severe punishment. Because the state's ability to subject the
defendant to the death penalty is based upon the establishment of
additional factual circumstances, and because there is no counterbalancing
110 "[The various [aggravating and mitigating] factors to be considered by the sentenc-
ing authority do not have numerical weights assigned to them . Proffitt, 428 U.S.
at 258 (1975).
120 [Olne of the most important functions any jury can perform in making ...
a selection [between life imprisonment and capital punishment] is to maintain
a link between contemporary community values and the penal system -a link
without which the determination of punishment could hardly reflect 'the evolv-
ing standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing sociyty.'
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
101 (1958)).
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state interest to the defendant's fundamental right to due process, the
defendant is entitled to require the state to prove its case against him
to the satisfaction of a jury.
DAVID R. SCHIEFERSTEIN

